The Choice of the Agenda in Labor Negotiations: Efficiency and Behavioral Considerations by Königstein, Manfred & Villeval, Marie Claire
The Choice of the Agenda in Labor Negotiations:
Efficiency and Behavioral Considerations
Manfred Ko¨nigstein, Marie Claire Villeval
To cite this version:
Manfred Ko¨nigstein, Marie Claire Villeval. The Choice of the Agenda in Labor Negotiations:
Efficiency and Behavioral Considerations. IZA Discussion paper n 1762. 2005. <halshs-
00175021>
HAL Id: halshs-00175021
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00175021
Submitted on 26 Sep 2007
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
IZA DP No. 1762
The Choice of the Agenda in Labor Negotiations:
Efficiency and Behavioral Considerations
Manfred Königstein
Marie-Claire Villeval
D
I
S
C
U
S
S
I
O
N
 P
A
P
E
R
 S
E
R
I
E
S
Forschungsinstitut
zur Zukunft der Arbeit
Institute for the Study
of Labor
September 2005
 
The Choice of the Agenda 
in Labor Negotiations: 
Efficiency and Behavioral Considerations 
 
 
 
Manfred Königstein  
University of Erfurt 
and IZA Bonn 
 
Marie-Claire Villeval  
GATE (CNRS, University Lumière Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure LSH) 
and IZA Bonn 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Discussion Paper No. 1762 
September 2005 
 
 
 
 
IZA 
 
P.O. Box 7240   
53072 Bonn   
Germany   
 
Phone: +49-228-3894-0  
Fax: +49-228-3894-180   
Email: iza@iza.org
 
 
 
 
Any opinions expressed here are those of the author(s) and not those of the institute. Research 
disseminated by IZA may include views on policy, but the institute itself takes no institutional policy 
positions. 
 
The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center 
and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent nonprofit 
company supported by Deutsche Post World Net. The center is associated with the University of Bonn 
and offers a stimulating research environment through its research networks, research support, and 
visitors and doctoral programs. IZA engages in (i) original and internationally competitive research in 
all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research 
results and concepts to the interested public.  
 
IZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. 
Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be 
available directly from the author. 
IZA Discussion Paper No. 1762 
September 2005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The Choice of the Agenda in Labor Negotiations: 
Efficiency and Behavioral Considerations 
 
The labor economics literature has shown that the “efficient bargaining” model, in which wage 
and employment are negotiated simultaneously, is less frequently used on unionized markets 
than the less efficient “right-to-manage” model, in which wage is determined via bargaining 
and employment determined subsequently and unilaterally by the firm. This paper reports an 
experiment in which the choice of the bargaining agenda is endogenous within a 
noncooperative game. We find that participants show a preference for decision authority and 
choose single-issue bargaining in most cases even though efficiency is lower than in multi-
issue bargaining. Furthermore, multi-issue bargaining induces unions to offer smaller payoff 
shares and leads to a higher conflict rate than in a single-issue bargaining. 
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1. Introduction 
Bargaining between employers and unions usually concerns wages but not the level of 
employment. The latter is left to the choice of employers. In economic theory this way 
of determining wage and employment is classically called the “right-to-manage” (RTM) 
model since employers retain the right to determine employment (Nickell and Andrews, 
1983). From a theoretical viewpoint this process of wage and employment 
determination is inferior to the so-called “efficient bargaining” (EB) model, which 
assumes that both, wage and employment, are determined simultaneously via 
bargaining between the two parties (McDonald and Solow, 1981). Under general 
conditions the latter model yields higher employment (higher efficiency) and lower 
wage than the RTM-model. Empirically, however, employers and unions seem to 
follow the single-issue bargaining rule in most cases. The predominance of this 
restricted agenda is puzzling and its rationale remains still largely undetermined. 
Behavioral economics can provide some insight and help in understanding this 
predominance. The aim of this paper is to investigate some of the reasons explaining the 
preference for a restricted bargaining agenda by means of a controlled laboratory 
experiment.  We can think of the five following reasons. 
First, employers may have a  preference for a larger degree of decision authority even if 
this is costly in terms of forgone profit. A single-issue bargaining agenda offers them 
full discretion over the management of the employment level. Second, unions may feel 
stronger when they bargain about both, wage and employment, and may therefore claim 
a larger share of payoff. Thus, in multi-issue bargaining the outcome may be less 
favorable for employers compared to a single-issue agenda. This is in contrast to 
theoretical models because it is usually assumed that the distribution of bargaining 
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power between the two parties is independent of the bargaining agenda. Third, actual 
bargaining behavior may differ more generally from theoretically assumed bargaining 
behavior such that the proposed influences of the bargaining agenda on efficiency may 
not be valid. Fourth, keeping flexibility with respect to employment may be valuable 
especially when business conditions change during the contract. And, fifth, unions may 
not fully internalize the disutility of unemployment. If the unions mainly care about the 
wage of the insiders, this reduces the attractiveness of the multi-issue bargaining 
relative to the single-issue bargaining. 
Our laboratory experiment mainly investigates the first three main hypotheses: whether 
individuals have a preference for decision authority and whether this preference for 
decision authority reacts to its cost, whether the distribution of bargaining power 
depends on the bargaining agenda, and whether efficiency is influenced by the 
bargaining agenda. All three hypotheses offer a partial explanation of the predominance 
of the single-issue bargaining agenda model. Our experiment does not directly deal with 
the hypothesis according to which actual business cycle dynamics favors this model but 
nevertheless, it allows for consideration of changing business conditions. The last 
hypothesis – whether unions do not internalize the disutility of employment – is in our 
view rather difficult to investigate empirically and will not be further addressed here. 
Our experiment is based on a non-cooperative game, involving firm-union pairs of 
players. In the first stage of the game, the firm opts for either a single-issue agenda 
(SIA) or a multi-issue agenda (MIA) in which the two issues are negotiated 
simultaneously. In the second stage, the union has to make a bargaining offer 
conditional on the bargaining model chosen in the first stage. In the third stage of the 
game, the firm accepts or rejects the offer and chooses the employment level if 
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applicable. Lastly, a random draw determines the good or bad state of nature and 
payoffs are displayed. We implement two experimental treatments of this game, varying 
the distribution of probabilities of the good and bad states of nature. We use a stranger 
matching protocol. The game theoretic benchmark solution – which assumes rational 
and selfish behavior – states that the firm should always choose the multi-issue 
bargaining model, for both treatments. Our experimental design gives us control with 
respect to issues that are hardly measurable with field data, e.g., the timing of wage and 
employment decisions, the structure of the bargaining process, and alternative wage 
opportunities. 
We find that firms choose the single-issue bargaining agenda in most cases. We 
interpret this as a preference for decision authority. It is in contrast to the theoretical 
prediction which is based on rationality and selfishness. However, the choice of 
bargaining agenda does react to the implied cost of decision authority in terms of 
forgone profits. Unions demand a larger payoff share and disagreement is more frequent 
in multi-issue bargaining than in single-issue bargaining. Finally, multi-issue bargaining 
does lead to higher employment, but the efficiency gains are smaller than theoretically 
predicted. These behavioral regularities indicate why in natural unionized labor markets 
employers may favor wage-only negotiations as well. 
The remaining of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents some related 
literature. The theoretical model underlying our study is developed in Section 3.  
Section 4 provides details on the experimental design and procedures. Section 5 reports 
the data and statistical analyses. Section 6 summarizes the main findings and provides 
some conclusions.  
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2. Related literature 
Whereas in a laboratory experiment bargaining rules can be controlled and manipulated 
easily to study their implications, this is far more difficult in natural employer-union 
conflicts. Thus, most empirical studies using field data test separately either the single-
issue or the multi-issue bargaining models through various methods.  
The prominent  empirical studies on the efficient bargaining model using field data are 
Brown and Ashenfelter, 1986; Card, 1986; Bean and Turnbull, 1988; Abowd, 1989. The 
equilibrium condition in the right-to-manage model states that the settled wage is equal 
to the marginal revenue product of labor, whereas in the efficient bargaining model, this 
latter corresponds to the negotiated wage diminished by an amount that corresponds to 
the union’s marginal rate of substitution of employment for wage. The alternative wage 
enters this term whereas it does not influence the right-to-manage equilibrium. 
Therefore, estimating the influence of the alternative wage in employment equation may 
offer a test of the efficient bargaining. This test conducted by Brown and Ashenfelter, 
1986 rejects the strong efficiency hypothesis required by Pareto optimality 
(employment should be set such as to equate the marginal revenue product to the 
alternative wage), but mixed support is found for the weak efficiency hypothesis, 
according to which employment is determined by both the contract and the alternative 
wages. Card, 1986 and Abowd and Kramarz, 1993 also conclude that the links between 
outside wage and employment are not consistent with the efficient bargaining model. 
In contrast, MaCurdy and Pencavel, 1986 takes the right-to-manage as the null 
hypothesis, checking whether the wage is equal to the marginal revenue product of 
labor, with the same data as Brown and Ashenfelter. Production functions are estimated 
to determine the marginal productivity of labor. Showing that both alternative wage and 
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employment influence productivity, they reject the labor demand equilibrium, as do 
Bean and Turnbull, 1988. Regarding the public sector, Eberts and Stone, 1986 
concludes to efficient bargaining, the estimations in Currie, 1991 accept the strongly 
efficient bargaining. 
A limitation of these results is that they depend largely on the instruments used in the 
regressions. As regards the estimation procedures, including the alternative wage as a 
regressor in a reduced-form employment equation and finding it significant is not 
sufficient to demonstrate the validity of the efficient bargaining model against the right-
to-manage model (Pencavel, 1991; Booth, 1995). As a matter of fact, with some 
specifications of the union’s utility function, the contract curve is independent of the 
alternative wage. Under specific conditions, the alternative wage may also influence the 
right-to-manage equilibrium. Alternatively, a significant outside option in the regression 
is compatible with other theories than efficient bargaining, notably the efficiency wage 
theory or the sequential bargaining model. MaCurdy and Pencavel, 1986 reject the labor 
demand curve equilibrium model but this is not sufficient to prove that contracts are 
first-best efficient, and the conclusion depends on the quality of the estimation of the 
marginal productivity and on the choice of the production function specification. Lastly, 
if one considers the case in which the labor demand curve and the contract curve 
coincide (Carruth and Oswald, 1987; Booth, 1995), it becomes impossible to 
discriminate empirically among these models. In total, the empirical assessment of the 
effects of the agenda on employment and efficiency remain ambiguous.  
In such a context, the opportunity to control the alternative wage, the firm’s profit 
function, the union’s utility function and all parameters to isolate the decision process 
constitutes a serious advantage of laboratory experiments. Early experiments on 
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bilateral monopoly have tested alternative models. In Siegel and Fouraker, 1960, a seller 
and a buyer have to agree on the price and the quantity of a commodity, through a 
process of offers and counter-offers. In contrast, in Fouraker, Siegel and Harnett, 1962 
and Fouraker and Siegel, 1963, the seller is a price leader, while the buyer chooses the 
quantity. Siegel and Fouraker (1960)’s results show, under condition of equal strength, a 
tendency toward a contract providing an equal share of maximum joint profits, all the 
more pronounced as information is complete and as the magnitude of differences in 
payoffs between contracts at the Pareto optimum and contracts adjacent to this optimum 
is large. The outcome of the joint negotiation is very close to the Pareto optimal solution 
and it does not lie on the buyers’ marginal revenue curve. In contrast, bargaining under 
price leadership leads to outcomes which are no longer efficient. However, the price-
quantity pairs are located on the demand curve. 
While these experiments reveal the importance of the institutional settings on the level 
of both wages and employment, they do not intend to endogeneize these settings. Yet, 
examining the origin of the bargaining settings could help in understanding the 
discrepancy between theoretical models and the reality of bargaining. The main task of 
this paper is to analyze the relationship between the choice of the agenda and the 
outcome of the negotiation. 
Grounded on the Rubinstein strategic game-theoretic approach, “agenda games” provide 
a more recent alternative approach of bargaining. Some consider an incomplete 
information framework using delay as a signaling device (Bac and Raff, 1996), others 
do not (Weinberger, 2000). In some cases, the agenda is determined exogenously 
(Fershtman, 1990), whereas in others the agenda is endogenized through a prior 
bargaining over the agenda (Conlin and Furusawa, 2000). In some games, the 
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realization of outcomes is postponed until all issues are negotiated (Ferschman, 1990), 
whereas others consider a separate implementation (Inderst, 2000).  These games with 
endogenous agendas usually oppose issue-by-issue vs. bundle-bargaining (Lang and 
Rosenthal, 2001; Younghwan and Serrano, 2004a; Younghwan and Serrano, 2004b). 
These theoretical analyses have not been empirically tested, as far as we know. Though 
we analyze the endogeneity of the agenda, our approach differs from these games 
inasmuch as we do not consider alternating offers and there is no delay in bargaining. In 
our game, the firm has a full discretion over the agenda but the proposer is the union. 
3. Model and theoretical predictions 
In this section we describe the basic structure of the bargaining game, our experimental 
design and the behavioral hypotheses. 
3.1. A stochastic model of the firm-union bargaining 
Consider a firm and a union with N members of which Nn ≤  may be employed. Firm 
and union care about wage w and employment n, which may be determined according to 
one of two possible agendas to be chosen by the firm: the single-issue bargaining 
agenda (corresponding to the Right-to-Manage model in the labor economics literature) 
or the multi-issue bargaining agenda (corresponding to the Efficient Bargaining in the 
literature). In case of SIA, firm and union bargain about w. After a wage settlement, the 
firm freely chooses n. In case of MIA, firm and union bargain about the bundle ( w and 
n) at the same time. Suppose that the union’s utility function u(w,n) and the firm’s profit 
function ),( nwπ  are as follows: 
 ( , ) ( )u w n nw N n uβ= + −  (1)
 ( , )w n pn wnαπ = −  (2) 
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with w > 0, 0 ≤ n ≤ N as defined above. The term (N – n) represents the number of 
unemployed members, u  is the status-quo utility of unemployment, and p > 0 is the 
output price received by the firm. The parameters α and β (with 1,0 << βα ) imply 
decreasing marginal returns of labor for the firm, respectively decreasing marginal 
utility of money for the union. The union has utilitarian preferences; it cares about the 
utility of all its members, either employed or unemployed. Output price p is stochastic: 
 { },l hp p p∈ , with prob(pl) = θ  and prob(ph)  = 1−θ  (3) 
where pl (ph) represents a low (high) output price. Both parties know the possible 
realizations of the random price and the probability θ . In MIA the random price is 
drawn after w and n have been chosen. In SIA w is determined before p is drawn, but n 
is chosen afterwards with the firm being informed about the realization of p. This 
information structure captures the idea that in SIA employers may react to changes in 
business conditions via adjusting employment. The parameter θ  influences the 
profitability of MIA relative to SIA. 
To conclude the model we assume that bargaining outcomes are determined via an 
ultimatum game in which the union states a wage (in SIA and MIA) and an employment 
level (only in MIA) which may be accepted or rejected by the firm. If the union’s offer 
is accepted by the firm (agreement), payoffs are determined according to (1), (2) and 
(3). Otherwise (disagreement), the parties earn disagreement payoffs Dπ π=  and 
, respectively. Du u=
System (1), (2) and (3) is a simple description of a firm-union conflict. Our 
experimental game, which we introduce below, relies on this structure. The ultimatum 
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game gives a strong strategic advantage to the first mover, the union. This can be 
viewed as a non-cooperative implementation of the so-called “monopoly union case”, 
which is usually modeled as a cooperative Nash Bargaining game where the union has 
all bargaining power. 
3.2. Experimental game and game theoretic solution 
So far, we described the structural features of our model in general terms for ease of 
comparison with other models of wage and employment determination.1 For the 
experiment we had to fix numerical values for the parameters and restrict the choice 
sets. The experimental game is represented by the matrix shown in Appendix A. The 
choices of wage and employment have been restricted to five different wage levels 
(rows) and seven different employment levels (columns). Each cell of the matrix 
displays three payoffs: the firm’s payoff if the price is low ( l lp n wn
απ = − , top entry) 
or high ( h hp n wn
απ = − , middle entry), and the union’s payoff (bottom entry). The 
numbers were computed according to the stochastic model of the employer-union 
conflict as described in sub-section 3.1 (except for multiplying the payoffs by 100 and 
rounding off) by relying on the following specifications: α =0.3, β =0.9, ph = 2.4, pl = 
1.4, N = 15, 0.08u = , { }0.1,0.2,...,0.5w∈  and { }3 6 212 2 2, , ...,n∈ ,  and 
.
25.1=Dπ
0.80Du = 2 The probability for the low price, θ , was 50% in some experimental 
sessions (treatment “50-50”) and 60% in others (treatment “60-40”). This parameter 
modification leaves the equilibrium decisions of both players unchanged (as worked out 
                                                          
1 Note that for pl = ph the payoff functions are equivalent to Booth (1995). 
2 A natural alternative specification could have been 20.1=⋅= uNu D . But we chose to reduce the 
union’s disagreement payoff to make disagreement less attractive. For the theoretical solution this change 
is irrelevant. 
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below). However, it influences equilibrium payoffs. We discuss this issue at a later 
point. The timing of decisions is the following. 
Stage 1: the firm chooses the bargaining agenda (MIA or SIA). 
Stage 2: the union chooses w (MIA and SIA) and n (only MIA). 
Stage 3: the firm accepts or rejects the contract. 
Stage 4: the random price is drawn. 
Stage 5: the firm chooses n (only SIA). 
 
Applying the notion of subgame perfect equilibrium and assuming that players are risk-
neutral and rational individuals the game theoretic solution implies that the firm chooses 
the multi-issue bargaining agenda, that the union demands w = 2 and n = 7 and that this 
contract is accepted.3 It can easily be verified that, given the bargaining agenda is MIA, 
the choice (w=2,n=7) is payoff maximizing for the union subject to the firm’s 
participation constraint (that the firm receives an expected payoff which is at least as 
large as the disagreement payoff of 125). 4
If the firm chooses SIA (this choice is off the subgame perfect equilibrium path), the 
union should demand w = 4, the firm should accept the contract and subsequently 
choose n = 1 (n = 2) if the random price turns out low (high). To derive the result for the 
SIA subgame one has to determine, first, the firm’s best reply choices of employment 
for each possible wage and each realization of the random price. In the payoff matrix in 
the Appendix the best reply function is indicated by the grey cells. Second, if one 
considers each possible wage level together with the best reply employment levels, one 
                                                          
3 I.e., row 2 and column 7. Here and in the following w and n denote rows and columns of the game 
matrix since experimental choices were labeled this way. This should not be confused with the internal 
values { }0.1,0.2,...,0.5w∈  and { }2212623 ...,,,∈n  that applied in computing the game matrix. 
4 Since entries in the payoff matrix result from multiplying the theoretical values by 100, the 
disagreement payoffs were multiplied by 100 as well. 
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can easily verify that the choice w = 4 maximizes the union’s expected payoff subject to 
the participation constraint that the firm’s expected payoff is at least 125. 
Table 1 summarizes the rational solution and provides the respective payoffs for each 
subgame and each treatment. Note that according to the game theoretic solution, the 
choice of the bargaining rule is not influenced by treatment “50-50” versus “60-40”. We 
applied these treatments to vary the profitability of MIA compared to SIA and to check 
for behavioral stability.  
Table 1. Rational choices of wage and employment and according payoffs 
for each bargaining agenda and treatment 
 
Treatment 50-50 60-40 
Bargaining agenda MIA SIA MIA SIA 
Wage 2 4 2 4 
Employment 7 pl: 1,  ph: 2 7 pl: 1,  ph: 2 
Union’s expected payoff  283.0 201.0 283.0 195.6 
Firm’s expected payoff  174.5 156.0 154.2 144.4 
 
3.3. Behavioral Hypotheses 
The experiment was designed to test for features of individual behavior that might 
explain why SIA is predominant in natural firm-union bargaining. A possible reason 
why the standard bargaining theory cannot provide a satisfactory explanation for this 
inefficient behavior is that it underestimates or ignores some psychological traits and 
judgment biases that may explain the departure from the theoretical predictions (for a 
review on the social psychology of negotiation, see for example Bazerman, Curhan and 
Moore, 2001; for a recent psychological analysis of what people subjectively value 
when they negotiate, see Curhan, Elfenbein and Xu, 2005). 
First, firms may choose SIA since they prefer having a choice upon employment rather 
than accepting or rejecting the offer of unions. We refer to this as “preference for 
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decision authority”. It is related to reactance theory and the concept of control in social 
psychology. Namely, employers may fear of a loss of control when employment would 
be determined via negotiations. According to reactance theory (Brehm, 1966) 
individuals attach positive value to the freedom of choice – i.e. having alternative 
options to choose from – and strive to maintain this freedom. In economics, the intrinsic 
value of the freedom of choice has been notably explored by Sen, 1988; see also Puppe, 
1996 for an axiomatic approach. Maier-Rigaud and Apesteguia, 2003 have conducted 
an experiment on the influence of the freedom of choice in the Prisoner’s Dilemma 
game and they show that the degree of cooperation is dramatically higher when the 
subjects have the possibility of choosing the game they play rather than when they are 
assigned to play the same game.   
In real work settings,  there could be an interaction of rational and behavioral issues. For 
example, a rational reason for firms to prefer wage-only bargaining are business cycles 
(Booth, 1995). Our stochastic game allows firms to consider the consequences of a high 
versus a low price (good vs. bad business), but nevertheless from a rational perspective 
they should prefer MIA. Based on these considerations we propose for our experiment: 
Hypothesis 1 (“Preference for decision authority”): There will be frequent choices of 
SIA rather than MIA due to firms’ preference for decision authority. 
Note that this hypothesis runs counter to the game theoretic prediction. Our 
experimental design separates these two alternative explanations of behavior. 
Second, we expect that the preference for decision authority – presuming it exists – will 
be moderated by the implicit cost of choosing SIA rather than MIA. If firms earn less 
profit in SIA there is a trade-off between a preference for decision authority and a 
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preference for money. To study this trade-off our experiment offers two kinds of 
variations in the cost of SIA: An exogenous variation induced by treatment 50-50 versus 
treatment 60-40 and an endogenous variation due to subjects’ actual experiences in the 
course of the experiment. According to the game theoretic solution the cost of SIA (in 
terms of forgone profit) is larger in treatment 50-50 than in treatment 60-40. So our data 
will exhibit variation in the cost of SIA whether or not behavior conforms to the 
theoretical solution, which allows us to test the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2 (“Cost of decision authority”): SIA is chosen less frequent when it is 
more costly in terms of forgone profit compared to feasible earnings under MIA. 
Third, if MIA offers a smaller payoff share to the firm than SIA and if firms care not 
only for absolute payoffs but also for relative payoffs, firms may find SIA less attractive 
than MIA. Social justice theory (Homans, 1961) and evidence from bargaining 
experiments (Roth, 1995) suggest that individuals do care for relative payoffs and reject 
unfair offers. Using the theoretical solution (table 1) to determine relative payoffs one 
finds that the firm’s payoff share (firm payoff divided by the sum of firm and union 
payoff) is smaller in MIA. An alternative explanation of a lower firm payoff share in 
MIA may be that unions feel more powerful when bargaining on two issues rather than 
one. This issue will be discussed later on. The above arguments lead to the following 
two predictions: 
Hypothesis 3 (“Care for payoff share”): The union offers a smaller payoff share in MIA 
than in SIA and firms pay attention to their payoff share. 
Hypothesis 4 (“Frequency of disagreement”): Given that Hypothesis 3 holds 
disagreement in bargaining is more frequent in MIA than in SIA. 
15
 
Hypothesis 4 is counter to the game theoretic solution which predicts no disagreements 
for both, MIA and SIA. More generally, rationality predicts not to reject an offer if it 
grants a payoff that is larger than the disagreement payoff. In the empirical analysis we 
will therefore control for offers to satisfy the firm’s participation constraint. 
Finally, we investigate whether MIA leads to increased employment compared to SIA 
(given that agreement has been reached). In line with the theoretical solution we predict:  
Hypothesis 5 (“Employment increase”): Employment is higher under MIA than under 
SIA. 
4. Experimental procedures 
The experiment was performed at GATE, Groupe d’Analyse et de Theorie Economique, 
Lyon, using Regate software (Zeiliger, 2000). Five experimental sessions were 
organized, with each session consisting of 15 periods of playing the above game. Three 
sessions started with 12 periods of play under the 60-40 treatment followed by 3 periods 
of play under the 50-50 treatment (within-subject treatment). Two sessions were run in 
the reverse order: 12 periods of the 50-50 treatment were followed by 3 periods of the 
60-40 treatment. Each session involved 16 volunteer participants. The data from the 
second part of the experiment were collected for explorative reasons (the impact of a 
change in the business climate in a within-subject comparison) but the analysis will be 
based only on between-subject comparisons; i.e., the data of periods 1 to 12. Thus we 
analyze a total of 480 observations of union-firm decisions (288 observations in the 60-
40 treatment and 192 in the 50-50 treatment).  
All 80 participants were drawn from the undergraduate population of the Management 
School of Lyon (40), the Engineering and Textile School of Lyon (20), and the 
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Engineer Central School of Lyon (20). No subject was experienced in this sort of 
experiment and none participated in more than one session. Participants remained 
anonymous.  
At the beginning of a session, the participants were informed about the rules of the 
game including the probability for a low (high) output price (for periods 1 to 12). At this 
stage, they were neither informed about the number of periods to be played nor that a 
second part with a changed probability (periods 13 to 15) would follow. They received 
instruction sheets for the first part (see Appendix B) and instructions were read aloud by 
the experimenter to provide common knowledge regarding the game rules, including the 
payoff matrix and the probability for low (high) output price. Instructions were phrased 
in neutral terms; the choices of wage and employment were presented as choices of a 
row and a column of the game matrix. Questions were answered privately by the 
experimenter. To check for understanding of the decision rules and payoff matrix, the 
participants had to fill out a questionnaire.  
Then, each participant was randomly assigned the role of union (“X-participant”) or 
firm (“Y-participant”) and kept the same role throughout the session. In each period, 
subjects were randomly paired and pairs were reconstituted as a new period began. To 
increase the number of independent observations, we used two terminal servers, with 
each managing a group of eight subjects (four unions, four firms). Subjects were 
unaware of this partitioning of the group. At the end of each period, the participants 
were informed about their respective payoff for the current period and a feedback table 
displayed their choices and payoffs in all previous periods. After period 12, they 
received instructions on the second part of the session, but were not informed about the 
number of periods to come. No questions were allowed. 
17
 
On average, a session lasted 45 minutes, excluding the time needed to answer a post-
experimental questionnaire and the payment of participants. All transactions were 
conducted in points and were converted at the end of the session into Euros at 300 
points = € 1. At the beginning of the session, each participant received an initial 
endowment of 1000 points, corresponding to a show-up fee, available for covering 
possible – though unlikely – losses. Each period the participant’s account increased (or 
decreased in case of a loss) by the payoff obtained in that period. At the end of the 
session each participant was privately paid in cash in a separate room in order to 
preserve confidentiality. On average, participants earned € 12. 
 
5. Experimental results 
5.1. Summary statistics 
Before testing our behavioral hypotheses we provide some descriptive statistics. Tables 
2 and 3 show frequency distributions and mean values of experimental decisions for 
periods 1 to 12. 
As shown in Table 2, a large majority of firms decide to restrain the bargaining agenda 
to wage-only negotiations: SIA is chosen in 70% of the cases in both treatments. 
Agreement is reached in most but not all games. The acceptance rate ranges between 
77% and 87% and is lower in MIA than in SIA. Furthermore, in MIA wage is lower and 
employment is higher than in SIA. Interestingly, in comparison with union demands, 
agreements lead to decreased wage and increased employment.  
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Table 2. Summary statistics (periods 1 to 12) 
 Treatment 50-50  Treatment 60-40 Total 
Bargaining agenda chosen by firms 
 Multi-Issue Agenda (MIA) 
 Single-Issue Agenda (SIA) 
 
58 
134 
  
86 
202 
 
144 
336 
 
30% 
70% 
 192  288 480 100% 
Frequency of agreement 
 MIA 
 SIA 
 
79.3%
87.3%
 
 (46/58) 
(117/134) 
 
  
76.7%
83.2%
 
 (66/86) 
(168/202)
 
77.8% 
84.8% 
 
 (112/144)
(285/336) 
Average wage demand 
 MIA 
 SIA 
 
2.14 
2.64 
 
  
2.27 
2.49 
 
2.22 
2.55 
Average wage* 
 MIA 
 SIA 
 
2.09 
2.46 
  
2.18 
2.23 
 
2.14 
2.33 
Average employment demand/offer 
 MIA (employment demand) 
 SIA (employment offer) 
 
3.40 
2.10 
  
2.84 
2.30 
 
3.06 
2.22 
Average employment *
 MIA 
 SIA 
 
4.28 
2.40 
  
3.70 
2.77 
 
3.94 
2.62 
Average firm payoff 
 MIA 
 SIA 
 
175.6 
178.1 
  
171.8 
180.8 
 
173.3 
179.7 
Average union payoff 
 MIA 
 SIA 
 
193.2 
170.1 
  
181.9 
166.7 
 
186.5 
168.1 
* Wage (respectively, employment) for contracts that reached agreement. 
 
A more detailed view upon the unions’ demanded wages (MIA and SIA) and demanded 
employment (only MIA) is provided by Table 3. In SIA only 14% of the unions claim 
the theoretically predicted wage w=4. Most unions ask for a lower wage. In MIA only 9 
out of 144 unions demand a wage-employment pair corresponding to the theoretical 
solution (w= 2 and n=7). While demanded wage equals the predicted level in most 
cases, employment is usually less than predicted.  
In line with the theoretical solution joint payoffs are higher in MIA than in SIA. But, it 
is only the union’s average payoff that increase whereas the firm’s average payoff 
decreases.   
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Table 3. Distribution of union demands 
Bargaining 
agenda 
SIA MIA 
  Employment Demand  
Wage Demand # % 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Sum % 
1 14 4.2 - - - - - -  1 1 0.7 
2 191  56.8 2 - 36 32 18 17 9 114 79.2 
3 74  22.0 1 9 9  4  3 - - 26 18.1 
4 47 14.0 - - -  2  1 - - 3 2.1 
5 10    3.0 - -  - - - - - - - 
Sum 336 100.0 3 9 45 38 22 17 10 144 100.0 
 
5.2. Preference for Decision authority 
Table 4 indicates that firms prefer SIA rather than MIA. The relative frequency of SIA 
in period 1 is 75% in both treatments (50-50 and 60-40), while it should be 0% 
according to the game theoretical prediction. The frequency changes only slightly in 
later periods. The data support Hypothesis 1 (“Preference for decision authority”).  
Table 4. Relative Frequency of SIA in Periods 1 to 12 
 Treatment 
 50-50 60-40 
Period (N = 192) (N = 288) 
1 0.75 0.75 
2 0.63 0.54 
3 0.69 0.67 
4 0.75 0.63 
5 0.69 0.54 
6 0.63 0.75 
7 0.75 0.75 
8 0.81 0.79 
9 0.69 0.75 
10 0.63 0.79 
11 0.69 0.75 
12 0.69 0.71 
 
To some degree the frequency of SIA may be due to errors rather than being systematic. 
Since theory predicts a relative frequency of 0%, any error would imply a deviation 
from the theoretical solution. Thus, “rationality plus noise” predicts a frequency of SIA 
equal or below 50%. We test this hypothesis versus the alternative that the frequency of 
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SIA is larger than 50%. According to binomial tests based on first period data we can 
reject the null-hypothesis in favor of the alternative for both treatments (p=0.039, N=16 
for treatment 50-50 and p=0.012, N=24 for treatment 60-40).5 Running the same test on 
all data (period 1 to 12) leads to p<0.001 (N=480). We conclude: 
Result 1:  The subjects show a preference for decision authority (SIA). This is the case 
already at the beginning of the experiment. Experience does not drive behavior toward 
the equilibrium prediction (MIA). 
To test Hypothesis 2 (“Cost of decision authority”) we consider behavior in period 12, 
i.e., after the participants have gained experience under both MIA and SIA. Specifically, 
we run a logit regression analysis (see Table 5) which estimates the probability of 
choosing SIA in period 12 depending on absolute and relative costs of SIA. Absolute 
cost of SIA is computed as the difference in expected firm’s payoffs between MIA and 
SIA based on average payoffs earned in periods 1 to 11 under each bargaining agenda.6 
Similarly, relative cost of SIA is based on the firm’s average payoff share (firm payoff 
divided by the sum of firm and union payoff) under each agenda in periods 1 to 11. 
Relative costs in addition to absolute costs were taken into account since subjects might 
consider relative earnings and/or absolute earnings. Absolute costs and relative costs are 
only weakly correlated (correlation coefficient: −0.028). The estimated influence of 
both cost terms is negative; i.e., if decision authority is more costly, it is chosen less 
likely. We thus state: 
                                                          
5 Statistics for one-tailed, exact tests. 
6 Specifically, we determined the payoff under each agenda for each realization of the random price and 
then computed expected cost of SIA (payoff MIA minus payoff SIA) accounting for the different  
probabilities for low (high) price depending on treatment (50-50 versus 60-40). 
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Result 2: With experience the preference for decision authority is moderated by a 
concern for the implied cost of the two bargaining agendas.  
This result is intuitive but somewhat preliminary. Due to a lack of sufficiently many 
independent observations we cannot provide a robust statistical analysis.7  
Table 5. Logit regression analysis of the choice of the bargaining agenda (1 = SIA, 0 = 
MIA) 
 
Variable Regression 
Coefficient 
Std. Error 
 
Constant 0.237 0.474 
 
Absolute Cost of  SIA - 0.015* 0.011 
 
Relative Cost of  SIA - 0.086* 0.054 
 
Number of observations                              33 
2χ =  5.754, Sig.= 0.056 
Pseudo R2                      22.6%   
Note: *: significant at 10%. 
5.3. Offers and Disagreements  
Hypothesis 3 (“Care for payoff share ”) predicts that the union offers a smaller payoff 
share in treatment MIA than in SIA and that firms pay attention to their share. Figure 1 
presents the distribution of the firms’ payoff shares (firm payoff divided by sum of firm 
and union payoffs) as offered by the union for both agendas.8  
                                                          
7 The regression is based only on the data of 33 individuals, since not all subjects experienced both 
bargaining agendas. 
8 In MIA the offered payoff share is solely determined by the union’s choice of wage and employment. In 
SIA the offered payoff share is computed based on the union’s choice of wage and assuming a 
sequentially rational employment decision by the firm. Indeed, employment was chosen sequentially 
rational in the large majority of cases (240 out of 285 cases [84%] that had reached agreement under 
SIA). 
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Figure 1. Distribution of payoff shares offered to firm by the union 
 
Indeed, the union offers lower shares in MIA than in SIA. This can be seen also by 
comparing mean offered shares (see Table 6). The reduction is significant according to a 
Mann-Whitney U-Test based on first period data (p = 0.006, N = 40, exact, one-tailed).9 
The data are consistent with the comparative statics of the game theoretic solution (see 
column “Theoretical Values” in Table 6). However, the observed levels of share offers   
are higher than theoretically predicted; i.e., offers are more generous. The data confirm 
what has been found in ultimatum game experiments: Offers reflect asymmetries in 
power (strategic advantage and disadvantage), but are less extreme than rationality 
theory suggests. Here, the concept of power derives from strategic asymmetries as 
described by the rational solution of the game. Alternatively, one may argue that the 
union feels more powerful in MIA than in SIA since in MIA it has more issues to decide 
                                                          
9 There is no significant difference between treatment 50-50 and treatment 60-40 (Mann-Whitney U-Test: 
p = 0.16, N = 40, exact, one-tailed). 
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on than in SIA. We refer to this as the “empowerment effect of a broader bargaining 
agenda”. It is in line with social exchange theory, which proposes that power in 
negotiation depends on the relative dependence of each party on the other party and that 
perceptions of power have an influence on negotiations (see Blau, 1964, and Wolfe and 
McGinn, 2004). Since firms depend more on unions when bargaining is on both, wage 
and employment, the unions may feel more powerful in MIA than in SIA. Psychologists 
have also shown that when given a choice, individuals frequently show a misperception 
of their power to control the situation (“illusion of control”, see Langer, 1975). 
Table 6. Average values of payoff shares offered to firms 
 Payoff share offered to firms 
 Observed value Theoretical value 
MIA   
60-40 43.9% 35.3% 
50-50 45.8% 38.1% 
SIA   
60-40 50.2% 42.5% 
50-50 50.6% 43.7% 
 
We summarize: 
Result 3: The payoff share offered by the union to the firm is smaller in treatment MIA 
than in SIA. This is consistent with the comparative statics of the game theoretical 
solution. It might also be due to an empowerment effect of a broader bargaining 
agenda. 
Our experiment does not allow to separate the two alternative explanations for result 3. 
To test Hypothesis 4 (“Frequency of disagreement”) we run a logit regression analysis 
(see Table 7) with the acceptance decision (= 1 in case of acceptance, and = 0 
otherwise) as dependent variable and the explanatory variables “offered payoff share”, 
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“offered absolute payoff”, as well as dummies for treatments (=1 for the 60-40 
Treatment and = 0 for the 50-50 Treatment) and bargaining agendas (= 1 if SIA and = 0 
if MIA).  
Table 7. Logit regression analysis of the acceptance decisions (1=acceptance, 
0=rejection) 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Dev. 
Constant   -13.722*** 1.655 
Offered absolute payoff      0.045*** 0.016 
Offered relative payoff  16.104** 7.615 
Bargaining agenda     -0.198 0.542 
Treatment      0.122 0.343 
Note: *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%. 
The offered absolute payoff and the offered payoff share exhibit strong positive 
influences; i.e., more generous offers are accepted more likely. This effect indicates that 
bargainers care for fairness. It is not consistent with the game theoretical solution. 
Namely, since the regression uses only those contracts that satisfy the participation 
constraint (474 out of 480), there should be no correlation between acceptance rate and 
offered payoff (share) from a rational viewpoint. The regression analysis also shows 
that after controlling for offered absolute and relative payoffs, neither the bargaining 
agenda nor the 50-50 versus 60-40 treatment have significant influence on acceptance 
decisions.  
Result 4: Disagreements are more frequent in MIA than in SIA. This effect is not 
directly caused by the bargaining agenda but indirectly due to more asymmetric (less 
fair)  offers in MIA than in SIA. 
5.4. Employment Level 
Hypothesis 5 (“Employment level”) predicts higher employment in MIA than in SIA. 
To investigate this we control for differences in the frequency of disagreements by 
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considering only those contracts that reached agreement. Figure 2 displays box plots for 
employment under both treatments and both bargaining agendas. Employment is 
substantially higher under MIA compared to SIA in both treatments. Since there are no 
significant differences between treatments (Mann Whitney U-test and T-test), we pool 
the data of both treatments for further analyses. Table 8 reports that the difference in 
employment levels between MIA and SIA is statistically significant in the first period as 
well as overall. 
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Figure 2. Distribution of employment levels (only accepted  
contracts) by treatment and bargaining rule 
The theoretically predicted employment level in MIA is n = 7. In SIA it is n = 1 (n = 2) 
if the realization of the random price is low (high). So, the level of observed 
employment in MIA is much lower than theoretically predicted, but the difference 
between agendas (higher employment in MIA) is in line with economic theory. 
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However, efficiency gains in MIA are relatively small. This is confirmed by comparing 
joint payoff of firm and union across treatments (see Table 9).10
Table 8. Statistical tests for differences in employment levels 
Average employment levels for accepted contracts 
 Period 1  
MIA 3.13 (N =  8) 
SIA 2.22 (N = 27) 
Mann-Whitney U-test p = 0.037 (exact, one-tailed) 
   
 Periods 1 – 12  
MIA 3.94 (N = 112) 
SIA 1.37 (N = 285) 
Mann-Whitney U-test p < 0.001 (exact, one-tailed) 
 
Table 9. Observed and theoretical joint payoffs for each treatment 
 Treatment 
 50-50 60-40 
Average joint payoff (observed)   
MIA 368.8 353.7 
SIA 348.1 347.5 
Expected joint payoff (theory)   
MIA 457.5 437.2 
SIA 357.0 340.0 
 
Theory predicts that joint payoff in MIA is about 100 monetary units higher than in SIA 
(both treatments), but actually the difference is much smaller (20.7 units in 50-50 and 
6.2 units in 60-40). We summarize: 
Result 5: Employment is higher in MIA compared to SIA, but efficiency gains of MIA 
are smaller than theoretically predicted. 
  
                                                          
10 Joint payoff is a more comprehensive measure of efficiency than employment since it accounts also for 
differences in agreement rates across treatments and bargaining agendas. 
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6. Discussion and Concluding Remarks 
Economic literature contrasts two standard models of employment determination in 
unionized labor markets. The first model (the Right-to-Manage model) corresponds to a 
single-issue bargaining agenda (SIA) whereas the second (the Efficient Bargaining 
model) corresponds to a multi-issue agenda (MIA). The predominance of SIA in real 
work settings is puzzling given the efficiency gains that should theoretically be 
achieved in case of MIA. Traditional theoretical models rely on bargaining solutions of 
cooperative game theory and do not endogenize the choice of the bargaining agenda. A 
more recent strand of literature relying on Rubinstein-type bargaining models of non-
cooperative game theory do allow for an endogenous bargaining agenda. In our study 
we developed a non-cooperative game that allows for choosing the bargaining agenda 
and reproduces the traditional efficiency gains associated with MIA compared to SIA. 
The theoretical solution is such that firms should prefer MIA, that MIA should lead to 
substantially higher employment and that bargaining should lead to agreement. 
Contrary we find that SIA is chosen more often than MIA (Result 1), and we interpret 
this as firm’s preference for decision authority. Firms prefer to decide on employment 
unilaterally rather than via bargaining even though MIA would force the union to 
tradeoff wage and employment. This behavior can be driven by an intrinsic valuation of 
the freedom of choice by the individuals, although in our game those who accept to 
reduce their freedom of choice by enlarging the scope for bargaining keep a veto power 
on the bargaining partners’ offers. The firm’s preference for decision authority is, 
however, moderated by the cost of decision authority (Result 2). Thus, if SIA becomes 
more expensive in terms of forgone profit, firms will more likely choose MIA. 
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Given actual choices in the experiment, MIA is less attractive relative to SIA than 
theoretically predicted. Namely, the payoff share offered by the union to the firm is 
smaller in MIA than in SIA and firms do care for relative payoffs (result 3). The latter is 
documented by a higher frequency of disagreement if the union offers a smaller payoff 
share (result 4). Both effects work against firms choosing MIA. Whether the smaller 
offered payoff shares derive from the union’s considerations of strategic power (in the 
sense of the game theoretic solution) or from an “empowerment effect of a broader 
bargaining agenda” can not be resolved here. 
As predicted by our model and more general unionization models, employment (and 
thus efficiency) is larger under MIA than under SIA. However, the efficiency gains are 
less pronounced than theory predicts (result 5). So even from a collectively rational 
perspective the incentive to decide for MIA is flawed relative to the benchmark 
solution. 
The above results are described in terms of the experimental variables and labels. To 
summarize more generally, we find that participants show a preference for decision 
authority and choose single-issue bargaining in most cases even though efficiency is 
lower than in multi-issue bargaining. Furthermore, bargainers care not only for absolute 
payoffs but also for relative payoffs. The bargaining agenda may influence not only the 
absolute but also the relative value of offers and consequently the frequency of 
disagreements. 
Our experimental results are to some extent suggestive for real work settings. First, 
bargaining about both, wage and employment, did induce higher employment levels 
than wage-only bargaining. It seems that with multi-issue bargaining unions will indeed 
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take more into account the tradeoff between several goals. Second, firms may be 
reluctant to give up the possibility to unilaterally determine employment. They may 
have a preference for decision authority and they may anticipate an empowerment of the 
union and more frequent disagreement in case of multi-issue bargaining. Of course, one 
must be cautious in extrapolating experimental results to real work settings. But they 
give clear indication that both rational and behavioral considerations drive the choice of 
the bargaining agenda and the determination of employment levels. 
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Appendix A. Payoff matrix according to employment and wage levels 
               n 
w 
 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
 143       165 175 180 181 180 178
1 256      304 332 351 364 374 381 
 127    134 141 148 154 161 168 
 128       135 130 120 106 91 73
2 241   274 287 291 289  284 276 
 143 166 190 213 236  259 283 
 113        105 85 60 31 1 - 32
3 226 244 242 231 214   194 171
 159 198 236 275 314   353 391
 98 75 40 0 - 44 - 89 - 137 
4 211 214 197     171 139 104 66
 174 228 281     335 389 443 496
 83 45 - 5 - 60 - 119 - 179 - 242 
5 196 184       152 111 64 14 - 39
 188 257      325 394 462 530 599
Each cell shows three payoffs: the firm’s payoff if the price is low ( , top entry) or high ( , middle entry), and the union’s 
payoff (bottom entry). 
wnnpll −= α wnnphh −= απ π
The dark grey cells represent the maximum employer’s payoff given the choice of a wage by the union. The light grey cells represent the maximum union’s 
payoff satisfying the employer’s participation constraint. The dark frame indicates the subgame perfect equilibrium given RTM according to the business 
climate. The light frames indicate the subgame perfect equilibrium given EB according to the business climate. 
This table was distributed to the participants during the experiment of course without any indication about the subgame perfect equilibria. No cell had a 
particular distinctive appearance. 
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Appendix B 
Instructions for the 50-50 Treatment 
You are now taking part in an economic experiment. Depending on your decisions during the 
experiment and the decisions of other participants, you can earn money. During the experiment, your 
entire earnings will be calculated in points and booked onto an account. At the beginning, your 
account shows 1000 points, which you receive as initial payment. At the end of the experiment, the 
total amount of points shown in your account will be converted to Euros at the following rate: 
300 points = € 1 
The experiment is divided into several periods. In each period, you can loose or win points. But note 
that losses can be avoided surely by your decisions and that possible losses in some periods should be 
offset by your wins in other periods. If after the final period your account shows a negative amount 
(this is extremely unlikely), your cash earnings will be zero. At the end of the session, your earnings in 
points will be converted into Euros and will be paid to you in cash in a separate room, in order to 
preserve the anonymity of your earnings.  
It is prohibited to communicate with the other participants during the experiment. Should you 
have any questions regarding the instructions, please raise your arm. An experimenter will answer 
your questions privately. If you violate this rule, we shall have to exclude you immediately from the 
experiment and from payments. 
The group of participants will be subdivided into two categories of roles: X participants and Y 
participants. At the beginning of the experiment, you will discover on your computer screen which 
role you will play. Each participant keeps his/her role throughout the entire experiment. 
In each period, all participants will be randomly matched in pairs (one X participant is matched with 
one Y participant) and take decision in their respective role. Interaction is anonymous. No participant 
will be informed about the name of the participants he/she interacted with. 
 
First period 
In this experiment, decisions are taken in considering the payoff table which has been distributed. This 
table shows rows 1 to 5 and columns 1 to 7. Each combination of a row and a column determines a 
cell. In each cell, you see three numbers which are shaded blue, yellow or white corresponding to 
different payoffs (in points) as explained below. Decisions are made as follows. 
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STEP 1 
Y participant chooses one of two decision rules: rule A or rule B. 
RULE A 
STEP 2 
 X participant is informed about the chosen rule. 
 X chooses one cell, i.e. one of the five rows and 
one of the seven columns. 
STEP 3  
 Y participant is informed about the chosen row 
and column. 
 Y decides on whether to ”accept” or ”reject”. 
 
• In case of ”accept”  
 
9 A chance move occurs which determines 
one of two possible outcomes: blue or yellow. 
The probability for blue is 50%, the probability 
for yellow is 50%. You may think of these 
probabilities, for example, as if one takes a 
single ball out of a basket with 5 blue balls and 
5 yellow balls. 
9 Payoffs are determined by the chosen 
cell and the result of the chance move. The 
blue shaded number in the cell is the payoff of 
Y if the chance move turned out blue. The 
yellow shaded number is the payoff of Y if the 
chance move turned out yellow. The white 
shaded number is the payoff of X. X 
participant is informed about the decision of Y; 
X and Y participants are informed about the 
chance move. 
• In case of ”reject” 
X participant is informed about Y’s rejection. 
Payoffs are 80 points for X and 125 points for 
Y, for this period. 
 
RULE B 
STEP 2 
 Participant X is informed about the chosen rule. 
 X chooses one row among 5. 
 
STEP 3  
 Y participant is informed about the chosen row. 
 Y decides on whether to ”accept” or ”reject”. 
 
• In case of ”accept”  
 
9 A chance move occurs which determines 
one of two possible outcomes: blue or yellow. 
The probability for blue is 50%, the probability 
for yellow is 50%.  
9 Y Participant is informed about the 
chance move. 
9 Y chooses one column among 7. 
The chosen row (by X) and column (by Y) 
together determine the chosen cell. 
9 Payoffs are determined by the chosen 
cell and the result of the chance move. The blue 
shaded number in the cell is the payoff of Y if 
the chance move turned out blue. The yellow 
shaded number is the payoff of Y if the chance 
move turned out yellow. The white shaded 
number is the payoff of X. X participant is 
informed about the chosen column and the 
chance move. 
• In case of ”reject” 
X participant is informed about Y’s rejection. 
Payoffs are 80 points for X and 125 points for 
Y, for this period. 
 
STEP  4 
End of the period. You are informed on your screen about the earnings of X and Y in this period. 
 
 
Next periods 
It is like the preceding period, except that you are randomly matched with a different participant. 
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Payoff table [this is the payoff matrix  presented in Appendix A] 
The blue shaded numbers are the payoffs of Y participant if the chance move turned out blue. 
The yellow shaded numbers are the payoffs of Y participant if the chance move turned out yellow. 
The white shaded numbers are the payoffs of X participant. 
 
New Periods  [these instructions,  in use for periods 13 to 15 and corresponding to the 60-40 
Treatment, were distributed only at the end of the first part of the experiment] 
The rules of the experiment are the same as in the previous periods, but the probability for blue is now 
60%, the probability for yellow is now 40%. You may think of these probabilities, for example, as if 
one takes a single ball out of a basket with 6 blue balls and 4 yellow balls. 
                                                    ----------------------------- 
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